Conversion – Response to Rabbi Angel
All of us in the Cross-Currents community should be appreciative of Rabbi Angel’s courteous and professional manner in continuing this discussion. For readers familiar with forums that are little more than soapboxes for the shrill and cathartically-challenged, this thread represents one of the better uses of the internet.
Rabbi Angel’s assurance that he does not embrace a Chinese menu approach to halacha immediately moves the discussion to a different plane. No issue is as important as this. Any approach to halacha that simply selects available options written by people with some background in Jewish texts, seeing them all as potentially valid, is simply beyond the pale of all halachic inquiry in recorded history. Determining practical halacha is both an art and a science, but its bottom line is comparing, contrasting, and assessing the likelihood of finding the truth, as best as a human being can comprehend it. Since we both apparently fully agree on that premise, what remains to be settled is how to find the halachic approach that represents the best way to make the conclusion flow from the textual evidence.
Regarding this question, I am afraid, that at the end of the day our respective positions have not moved at all. I don’t see anything in Rabbi Angel’s response that is very different from his original article, and nothing that would get me to change my mind.
Rabbi Angel does raise some extremely important questions in the middle of his piece. I will address my remarks to the numbered points that he makes in the middle of his article, and hope that this will provide the greatest service to our readers
1) Rabbi Angel asserts that Rav Uziel was not a daas yachid – an isolated voice – swimming against the current. I do not have immediate access to Prof. Shilo’s article; this handicaps me in this part of the discussion. I will venture a guess, however, that my colleagues and I (and yes, I consulted some important ones!) would have heard of many of them if they were among the most important halachic luminaries. It is crucial for people to realize that many people write responsa. Sometimes the only thing they have in common is a beard. They represent a vast difference in competence and erudition. Publishing a collection of responsa does not a posek make. How those responsa are received by the public of talmidei chachamim means everything.
More importantly, Rabbi Angel argues that Rav Uziel, zt”l, is in good company, that his position is upheld by the Talmud, Rambam, and Shulchan Aruch. This is the most serious issue that divides us, the single one that cannot go unchallenged.
Rabbi Angel’s position is the argument from silence. Because the Talmud, Rambam, and Shulchan Aruch do not explicitly mention that the potential convert must, lechatchila, accept all mitvos, Rabbi Angel believes them to hold that there is no such requirement. But Rabbi Angel surely realizes that some of the most important issues in halacha were not discussed explicitly in the texts he mentioned, and yet are saturated with information about them. By probing the meaning of different parts of the sugya/ legal periscope, geonim, rishonim, and acharonim have all been doing the same thing for almost a millennium and a half: showing legal conclusions that follow logically and inexorably from halachic texts.
Yichud – the sequestering of an unrelated male and female who are not married to each other in a non-public area – is clearly forbidden by the Talmud, Rambam and Shulchan Aruch. What would Rabbi Angel say to one of his congregants asking about the permissibility of yichud of an adoptive parent and his/her adopted child of the opposite gender? Would he tell them that it is forbidden, based on the simple reading of all these texts, which certainly – from their silence – make no distinction between unrelated people and adoptive parents? Would he regard modern poskim who permit such yichud as going against the accepted halacha of hundreds of years?
The Talmud, Rambam and Shulchan Aruch all forbid milk produced by non-Jews. Does Rabbi Angel tell his congregants that they may not purchase milk in a New York supermarket, or does he tell them that there is a distinction between chalav akum and chalav stam, although the terminology is nowhere to be found in those early sources?
Nowhere does the Rambam forbid a husband to beat his wife. Is the ban on such behavior (cited only by the Ramo, in the Ashkenazi part of Shuchan Aruch) an Ashkenazi innovation? Will Mrs. Angel agree with this?
Those who have studied responsa through many centuries, in many lands, Ashkenazic and Sephardic, know of many common elements they share. One of them is squeezing meaning out of terse texts. Those who write responsa do not invent new law and blame it on old text. They carefully build cases showing that conclusions follow from the text. Those who permit yichud with adopted children, and drinking chalav stam, make the case that the strongest reading of Talmudic text and key Rishonim makes such conclusions inevitable or at least the most likely among competitors. They argue that the leniency is inherent in the older text. Those who see responsa writers as inventing halacha de novo belong to a different group. They are called non-Orthodox.
It cuts both ways. Sometimes, examination of the sugya yields stringencies, not leniencies. The position of the Beis Yitzchok on conversion was not his invention, but follows from the sugya, especially the position of the Ritva and Nimukei Yosef in Yevamos. You can reject the Beis Yitzchok, but only in one of two ways. You can either show that his analysis of the Ritva is faulty, or show that a plurality of Rishonim disagreed with the Ritva. My own sense, for what it is worth, is don’t hold your breath.
Nor, for that matter, is the Rambam really silent on the matter. He, too, cites the gemara banning the accepting of converts during times when the motivation of the convert is suspect, like the days of Shlomo. The “simple” reading of the Rambam, if anything, is to make the mindset of the potential convert crucial indeed. Rav Uziel himself is forced to take note of this in his responsum, and offers an answer that was roundly rejected by the vast majority of people who entered and continue to enter the serious conversation of halacha.
This point cannot be made too forcefully. Readers of the popular literature on the current gerus controversy get the feeling that there was some sort of conspiracy abrew, in which Rav Uziel was unfairly targeted, or moved aside in favor of more politically correct poskim like the Beis Yitzchok and R Chaim Ozer, who somehow ingratiated themselves with that famous cabal, the Elders of Bnei Brak. Nothing could be further from the truth. Rav Uziel’s responsa have been in the public domain for many decades, pored over by many people. Rav Uziel was an accomplished talmid chacham, and towers over many – but certainly not all – of those who have examined his reasoning. Halachic process is primarily a group process. When a large majority of scholars sees an argument one way, they will trump a single greater scholar. (Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt”l, largely accepted as the most important posek in America during his lifetime, stood head and shoulders over most of his nearest competition. Yet, on any number of issues, the majority of lesser scholars completely rejected some of his novel opinions, whether stringencies or leniencies.) It happens to be that this particular responsum is not that complex at all, and is readily grasped. I have yet to meet someone who has decades of experience with serious learning and/or is a genuine “player” in contemporary halacha, who is personally convinced that, as Rav Uziel asserts, those who initially are unwilling to accept the yoke of mitzvos will ultimately do so after conversion. If anything, in the decades since he penned his responsum, we have had time to observe the conduct of thousands of candidates, and to empirically determine whether converts according to more liberal protocols move towards greater observance or not. Rav Uziel’s conjecture has not been borne out over time.
2) Rabbi Angel argues that even if Rav Uziel is a daas yachid, he should not be dismissed. Isolated voices have been correct in the past. This is true, and mostly irrelevant. If halacha were indeed a Chinese menu, decisors would be free to move up and down the columns, choosing between competent opinions. But it isn’t, and decisors are charged with finding the best view, not just any view. Kach he darka shel Torah.
Deos yachid do have an honorable place in halacha. They can be relied upon by the communities and students of those who authored them. Communities that asked Rav Uziel for guidance, and to whom he responded with his opinion, might certainly want to rely upon his words. Deos yachid can be relied upon even by others, in emergency circumstances. . But here is the rub. Those who rely on minority opinions should not expect others to accept their point of view, especially when it impacts upon them directly. It is hard to imagine any area in halacha in which a decision made by one decisor directly affects more people. When you call someone a proper convert, you change his/her interactions with countless Jews with whom that convert interacts. Every shul he attends, every school to which he sends his children, every bottle of wine he pours, every kesuba to which he affixes his name in testimony – all are impacted by that decision. It is perfectly understandable that, in an ever shrinking world, batei din are increasingly aware of the need to agree upon some minimum standards. Those who do not wish to abide by them are free to act independently, but it is hardly reasonable to expect others to treat someone their conscience tells them is not Jewish as a full halachic member of the community
I stress the word “invalid,” because there are many arguments that a decisor or a beis din would reject for themselves, but concede had enough support to be reckoned with after the fact. (Admittedly, there are people who simply refuse to recognize anything but their own arguments. I would readily join with Rabbi Angel in condemning the ‘my way or the high way’ folks. They are not the ones we are dealing with here.) But there are times that an opinion stands so apart from the main body of thought, that it ceases to act as even a daas yachid. (See Mishnah LeMelech, Aveil 3:1, end.)
How do we protect the innocent gerus candidate from the cross-fire? If anything, the onus of responsibility is upon those who knowingly employ standards different from the majority to inform their gerus candidates that they should expect bumps in the road ahead. Informed consent is a far better way to go than pointing a finger at the “closed-mindedness” of those who faithfully vote their halachic conscience.
3) Despite Rabbi Angel’s aversion to rating gedolim, and his evidence of contradictory ratings, such rating is very much a part of halacha. The Talmud has many examples of it; so do the responsa literature. We did in fact have to pick between different Rishonim (should we be surprised that there were different Ashkenazic and Sephardic rankings?); there are seforim which offer guidelines about disputes between Magen Avraham and Taz; contemporary poskim did assign different weights to psakim of Rav Moshe and the Tzitz Eliezer. Who votes? Like many honors in the secular world, those who are closest to the level of achievement under consideration are the ones who are in the best position. For all the nervous questioning over recent decades over who is in the top circles, Klal Yisrael never had a problem differentiating between major league players and members of the farm teams.
4) Can a posek of lesser rank turn out to be correct? Of course. But until he convinces others of this, it is irrelevant. Whoever is rendering a decision has to examine the evidence and go with it. He won’t pick a minority opinion swamped by opposing ones – unless he believes in Chinese menus.
Cross-Currents is not the proper venue for complex halachic analysis. I have limited myself to general considerations, points that a great cross-section of our readership might benefit from. In the end, the conversion without full acceptance of mitzvos turns on how we understand the difference between two lines of the Gemara. One of them mandates that the court examine the candidate for improper motivation. Another accepts the improperly motivated candidate after the fact. The Ritva makes one case. Rav Uziel makes another – predicated upon taking the convert’s declaration of fidelity to the Torah at face value, predicting that even if he did not mean it at the moment, it will transition into something more substantive. It might be useful to contrast this with a different formulation:
Pro forma conversion, which contains nothing more than a change in label, is unacceptable and has no force in turning the “convert” into a Jew for any purpose whatsoever
Interestingly, the author of those words is Rav Ben-Zion Uziel, Mishpetai Uziel vol.2, Yoreh Deah #66.
“But here is the rub. Those who rely on minority opinions should not expect others to accept their point of view, especially when it impacts upon them directly.”
This calls to mind the gemara about Beis Shammai and Beis Hillel’s machlokes re tsaras ervah. The practice at the time was that each group was noheig like its own psak, and they did not hesitate to intermarry — BUT they would also inform the other group if, le shitasam, the person was possul. IOW, a person who acc. to Beis Shammai was perfectly kosher would be a mamzer acc. to Beis Hillel — and if such a person sought to marry into a Beis Hillel family, then they were duly informed of the situation.
Is R. Angel prepared to do that? Is he prepared to say — acc. to me and my Rov, R. Uziel, this convert is a legitimate ger, but acc. to most opinions his conversion is invalid and he remains a non-Jew? And hence he should not be allowed to intermarry EXCEPT among the group who view R. Uziel as their Rov?
As an admirer of both rabbis involved in this exchange I must thank Rabbi Adlerstein for the way he has responded to Rabbi Angel and his elegant statement of the position of those of us who while committed to halacha would love sometimes to bend it our way but know in our hearts if not always in our minds that there is a point beyond which we cannot go. This piece admirably describes that position. Yeyasher Cochacha.
As R. Alderstein writes, this is not the place for halachic debate. So one meta-historical comment and one political one.
Take a much less controversial topic, and one where I have some expertise – davening maariv/reciting the shema early. There is a vast halachic literature that is covered in detail by many chachmai hamesorah over the centuries. Read the classic literature as well as a long article by Prof. Katz ztl on this topic. Prof. Katz’s historical perspective adds a different dimension than halachic decisors. Poskim tend not to write like academics who identify trends and shifts in what are otherwise described as less nuanced (changes/refinements in) positions. How does this relate to practical halacha? In the minds of most, hardly at all, unless a tier 1 Posek picks up the article and decides to rely on it to pasken a particular issue. I strongly suspect many orthodox jews and certainly rabbis would be fascinated by Prof. Katz, but it would not necessarily be the basis for Psak. The major point that R. Angel is arguing in my mind is a historical one – the past is hardly uniform and there was innovation in the 19th century and psak tilted somewhat afterwards. Is this accurate? Perhaps. Do Poskim acknowledge even the possibility? Rarely, if ever. Poskim tend to establish two (or three) positions and line up opinions as supporting one or the other, often understating minor differences or historical context; a very different methodology – stressing concept over context. The halakhic process typically integrates to varying degrees custom, precedence and conceptualization, not history. (I, like most reading this, was trained in the conceptual method and do not always recognize that in an area with two fundamental positions there may be many more slightly different nuanced opinions. R. Alderstein’s last paragraph – Ritva versus R. Uziel is a perfect example – a historian might find many more nuanced positions along that spectrum.)
Beyond that, I suspect that the long historical record, both its interpretation and significance would also be heatedly debated. Even if Prof. Shilo’s historical assessment is accurate, will poskim read it and use it in particular situations modifying recent practice? Rabbi Angel urges them to do so given the current situation. Thus there are two issues: 1) theoretically, how accurately has Prof. Shilo classified previous decisors? 2) practically, his being correct is certainly necessary to support R. Angel, but not sufficient until utilized in the halakhic process. (I may have once posted the comment by R. Meir Lichtenstein in a shiur on this topic quoting R. Y. EMDEN that when he says shelo asaini Aved he thinks shelo asaini av beit din.)
The political issue continues to grow. My earliest post on this topic, pondered if a Slifkinite would be converted? The debate has sadly moved on – forget converting the individual, some would now disqualify any dayan (including both Rabbi A’s) who might harbor similar views. The level of distrust this creates is depressing and the crisis in Israel is not going away. On recent trips to Israel, I have gained some confidence that very slowly and differently than most assume, progress will come.
>Determining practical halacha is both an art and a science
What is the basis for this statement? Is this an observation, or a kabbalah? Or perhaps it is a colloquialism?
You say that you are handicapped because you do not have access to Prof. Shilo’s article. Why? I am sure that Rabbi Angel would have supplied you a copy? (For the record, I have not read the article and have no particular point of view in the debate.)
It is a colloquialism that I received as a kabbalah from some trustworthy mentors who made the observation
To noclue –
If I asked and waited for the article, I would then have to read it before responding. Getting the posts up in a timely manner seemed like a better, albeit not perfect, way to go
I think you and Rabbi Angel actually agree on point 3. You’re both saying that different cultural segments of the Jewish world have different rankings of rabbanim. I think R’ Angel is also adding to that an observation that Sepharadim tend to read everybody’s books, and Ashkenazim tend to read Ashkenazi books, so Ashkenazim have a harder time understanding that Sepharadim have a different ranking.
This was a very impotant and polite exchange of views. We need more of them, even if views will differ on the issue being discussed at hand.
Dr. Gewirtz, I would argue that “psak”, by its very nature, is a function of tradition. “Psak” has its own unique methodology, which is very difficult to acquire on one’s own; hence the emphasis placed on “shimush” (which roughly translates as “apprenticeship”) from an experienced “posek”. “Book knowledge” alone does not make one a “posek”; practical experience does. Many great “talmidei chachamim” have given “shiurim” that they themselves would not rely on for purposes of “p’sak”, not because they think their “sevaros” were incorrect, but because they were not forfulated in the spirit of “psak” — the concept of “halachah v’lo l’maaseh”. [I once saw an astounding comment from the Chida along these lines, but that’s a topic for a different discussion. An example that is very relevant to the present discussion can be found in the Mossad HaRav Kook edition of Ritva to Yevamos 24b, footnote #650, authored by Rav Aharon Yoffen.] I submit that articles written from an academic perspective, fascinating as they may be, also do not meet the criteria of “halachah l’maaseh”; they are of, well, acadamic interest.
That quote from Rav Yaakov Emden, by the way, can be found in the Chida’s “Shem Gedolim” under the entry for Rav Yaakov Emden. Rav Yaakov Emden WAS a Rav for a short while in his younger years, and tThe Chida, who knew Rav Yaakov Emden personally, writes that the saying reflected his bad experience.
Chaim Wolfson – it may yet be the time for Moshiach. We agree! Academics are not poskim and shimush is critical. BTW you are perilously close to Prof. Urbach ztl who defined halacha not (primarily) as text based but tradition based, but let’s not veer into areas of difference. A posek like RYYW ztl was unique in his ability to read academic works and OPENLY integrate into psak. I have argued that academic works should be read by poskim particularly when they can provide insight to help deal with extraordinary circumstances. I have a few real examples that are not appropriate for a blog, in a narrow area where I have some (academic) expertise. And thank you for the reference to the Chida – alas I never read his seforim.
Rabbi Alderstein, I think you argue something backwards here: It is clear to almost anyone who knows how to read gemara and rishonim that Rav Uzziel’s is the basic, peshat interpretation of the Rambam and the various gemarot. It is not just an argument from silence, as you describe it, but makes perfect sense out of the gemara’s demand that the ger be informed of a few “kalot” and “hamurot” so that he can accept their *consequences* (which is what kabbolas ha-mitzvos means in this interpretation and is exactly what Israel accepted at Sinai).
You argue that interpretations far from the peshat can still be firmly grounded in the sources, and in this you are of course absolutely correct. Nor would Rabbi Angel disagree. But would an interpretation that allows yichud between a father and his adopted daughter *disqualify* the peshat interpretation that prohibits such yichud? Would those who feel that the gemara allows gentile milk *disqualify* the peshat reading that prohibits it? Of course not! Nor does Rabbi Angel deny that the reading of the Beis Yitzchok and so many other acharonim can be firmly grounded in the sources. But in this case he wants to know why davka the peshat is vehemently delegitimized and so completely marginalized. The answer, it seems to me and many others, is not a halakhic one at all. It is rather a not fully kosher mix of hashkofoh and politics. The is what accounts for so many articles in the religious press claiming that there is one, and only one, valid approach to accepting the mitzvos.
correction it should be “rif, rambam, tur, rabbainu nissim, rashi, rosh, and basicaly all other giants of the time argued otherwise (ie that it was permitted). Those who do argue that it is generaly refer to it as yaish omrim…..”
Indeed it is a hopeful sign. By the way, since I am a wolf(son), does that mean you’re a lamb?
Seriously, though, this is far from the only thing on which you and I agree. I think it would be very helpful for public discourse if we all kept in mind that what we agree on far outweighs what we disagree on.
Another point forgotten is that the situation of Jews up to the 19th century, and during a certain period of the 20th, was totally different than today. WADR, it’s just wrong to marry people who meet in college and than want to get married, knowing full and well that they will not be observant. I know “orthodox” rabbis who do such giyurs.
To Ken Bloom (#7) –
I do not believe this to be true at all, unless you mean in the last hundred years or so. Before that, I am not aware of any tendency to ignore Sefardi seforim. It could hardly be true in the time of the Rishonim, and wasn’t thereafter either.
To Yitzie Kagan (#11) –
I could not disagree more. It is not the simple pshat in Rambam, unless you look only at one line of the Rambam and ignore others, like the need to wait and clarify observance before full acceptance. Most seforim I have seen written by people who certainly know a good deal about learning do not think that it is the simple pshat in the Rambam. (An exception seems to be R. Aharon Yaffen z”l in his notes in the Mosad Rav Kook edition of the Ritva to Yevamos 24. Even he has to deal with contradictory evidence from other passages in the Rambam.)
It would not matter if you were correct. The Rambam is not the only Rishon. You would have to demonstrate – at least is a matter that is d’orayso and has huge impact on the public – that the majority of Rishonim concur. Picking one Rishon to rely upon is not the way halacha is conducted.
Unless, of course, that it is a Chinese menu.
WIth regards to the Rambam a literal reading without any preconceived notions would lead one to interpret like RAv chayim oyzer and Reb MOshe and most gEdoyley yisroel in the past hundred years that Kabbalat hamitzvot is the basicdefinition of conversion itself an is meakev. It is surprising how very few look at this Rambam;
” רמב”ם הלכות איסורי ביאה פרק יב
כל העכו”ם כולם כשיתגיירו ויקבלו עליהן כל המצות שבתורה והעבדים כשישתחררו הרי הן כישראל לכל דבר שנאמר הקהל חוקה אחת יהיה לכם ומותרין להכנס בקהל י”י מיד, ”
The literal reading of this rambam is that “kabbalat KOL hamitzvot is necessary that he/she be part of “keyisrael lechol davar” and be able to marry a yisrael! (and the languge is “jkol hamitzvot” ALL MITZVOT!
Likewise it is remarkable how those who misread the rambam either fail to note the following rambam and “Water” it down:
רמב”ם הלכות איסורי ביאה פרק יג
וכן לדורות כשירצה העכו”ם להכנס לברית ולהסתופף תחת כנפי השכינה ויקבל עליו עול תורה צריך מילה וטבילה והרצאת קרבן, ואם נקבה היא טבילה וקרבן שנאמר ככם כגר, מה אתם במילה וטבילה והרצאת קרבן אף הגר לדורות במילה וטבילה והרצאת קרבן.”
the Rambam writes literally that BEFORE anything, before we are going t5o apply the practie of milah tvila and korbanot: the ger must want “lehikaness labriss” (to enter the covenant), “ulehistofefe tachas kanfey hashchinah” to be hoevred under the wingsof the shinah (wants to have a close relationship with Hashem which hovers on the Am Yisroel), and he must “yekabel alav OHL TORAH” he must accept upon himself THE YOKE OF TORAH! (what is a yoke if not the acceptance to live by the ideals and practices of TOrah and mitzvot. Does Rav Uzziel and thse who feel that the “literal” rambam does not require acceptance of mitzvot, interpret “kabbalat ohl mitzvot” in parshat vehaya im shamoa to mean ONLY that the accepts the consequences but not to “shamoa tishmeooh el mitzvoay ” not to mean to accept to keep them? or does it mean the literal pshat: that one accepts to keep having mind the consequences if one will not keep them? DOes G-d want us to accept the punishment or does G_d want us to accept the observance of mitzvot anf the punishments are merely a “stick” to guide us to that direction?
In any event the ltieral reading of the Rambam is exactly the “primtive” of the “unenlightened” that conversion is “Aceptance to live by TOah and mitzvot.
Some commenters here and elsewhere are confused by the follwoing Rambam:
רמב”ם הלכות איסורי ביאה פרק יג הלכה יז
מכלל העכו”ם וחוששין לו עד שיתבאר צדקותו, ואפילו חזר ועבד כו”ם הרי הוא כישראל מומר שקידושיו קידושין, ומצוה להחזיר אבידתו מאחר שטבל נעשה כישראל, ולפיכך קיימו שמשון ושלמה נשותיהן ואע”פ שנגלה סודן”.
They fail to realize that the literal reading is contrary to their interpretation. Even Rav Yaffen stumbles on “choshshin loy ad sheyitbaer tzikatoy”, which is the opposite of their reading: The literal words of the rambam that in event that the tzidkus is not clarified one may NOT MARRY THEM!
Now let me offer a ltieral reading to the other part of the Rambam that confuses them: where the Rambam writes that even if he later worshipped avoda zara he is a still a Jew (mumor): The Rambam refers to someone whom we had the “chashash” AND THERE WAS “YITBAER TZIDKATOY” WE REACHED A LEVEL WHERE THE CONVERT WAS KEEPING MITZVOT! and *THEN* reverted to worship Avoda Zarah! then we say “keyisroel mumar” but not if there was never “yistbaer tzidkatoy”!
This way we understand Shimshon and Shlomoh: Of couse there was “peer pressure” in the kings house that initially they would accept to live by the tents of G-d and Shlomoh would enforce it initially and therefore the married these wives. But *LATER* they reverted their old practices!
Look again at the earlier wuotes of the Rambam i presented. I can see no other *literal* interpretatinon other than saying: tha tacceptance of mtizvot is THE defining point of conversion, iwthout which there is NOTHING TO DISCUSS!
My apologies to the very astute reader who pointed out what he believed was an ironic flaw in my championing the Beis Yitzchok over Mishpatei Uziel. He noted that the practice of batei din is to teach gerus candidates a significant amount of Torah before their acceptance, apparently accepting the opinion of Minchas Elazar (vol. 4 #63) over the much greater R. Akiva Eiger (vol.1 #41)
The irony is in the eyes of the beholder. Batei din have not opted for the later Minchas Elazar over the earlier and greater R. Akiva Eiger. They have opted for the much earlier yet Meiri (Sanhedrin 59A ד”ה ב”נ שראינוהו) and the Maharsha (Shabbos 31A ד”ה א”ל). The Minchas Elazar is often mentioned in discussion simply because he explicitly disagrees with R. Akiva Eiger, utilizing an argument that talmidei chachamim all seem to find persuasive, but would not have carried the day without the earlier sources.
Stating that psak is an art and science is not a direct quote from the Me’iri, but quite close.
The Me’iri in the second perek of Yoma (26a) states that we see Talmidei Chachomim who when presented with a question “can’t even find the door.” That is a direct translation. He continues to state that there are two things required for psak, knowing the Talmud and its Kabbalah and second, full intelligence in it to understand one thing from another.
The ability to derive one thing from another requires clarity of the sources, clarity of the situation and the ability to relate issues clearly. Definitely a blend of art and science.